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ABSTRACT 
 
The demand for air transportation is anticipated to continue to grow in the future. In order to 
accommodate future demands, the U.S. Joint Planning and Development Office (JPDO) 
proposed the Next Generation Air Transportation System (NextGen). One of the NextGen 
technologies currently under development is Automatic Dependent Surveillance – Broadcast 
(ADS-B), which is a new satellite-based surveillance technology.  
 
In order to achieve the adoption of ADS-B, equipage by aircraft operators is essential. 
However, it is sometimes difficult to achieve the transition from a current technology to a new 
technology. Therefore, encouraging the individual user’s adoption is a key factor of the 
successful technology transition. 
 
This thesis develops the system dynamics model to represent how individual users adopt a new 
technology, and analyzes how the adoption of new technologies can be encouraged using the 
system dynamics model. The effects of the following four incentive policies are examined: (1) 
Acceleration of operational benefits, (2) Preferred access, (3) Financial incentive, and (4) 
Mandate equipage.  
 
The result of the policy analysis shows the each incentive policy is effective to encourage the 
early adoption of ADS-B. Especially, achieving early benefits is important to accelerate 
equipage. Moving forward the mandate date of ADS-B equipage also can be effective to 
increase total benefits. 
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
 
1.1 Motivation 
The demand for air transportation has been increased and is anticipated to continue to grow 
in the future. According to the forecast by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), air 
transport passengers in the U.S. are projected to double by 2025. It is believed that the 
current air transportation system cannot accommodate future demands. In response to the 
future increased demand, the U.S. Joint Planning and Development Office (JPDO) proposes 
the Next Generation Air Transportation System (NextGen), which includes a set of new 
technologies to increase capacity as well as to enhance safety and security. The 
implementation of NextGen has already begun. One of the NextGen technologies currently 
under development is Automatic Dependent Surveillance Broadcast (ADS-B), which is a new 
satellite-based surveillance technology (Joint Planning and Development Office, 2007). 
   
Technology transitions are essential to solve complex problems in many cases. However, it is 
sometimes difficult to achieve a smooth transition from a current technology to a new 
technology. Some technologies require individual user’s adoption to achieve the technology 
transition. Even though a new technology is developed, if individual users do not adopt it, the 
benefit of the technology cannot be achieved. Therefore, encouraging the individual user’s 
adoption is a key factor of the successful technology transition.  
 
This thesis develops the model for how individual users adopt a new technology and analyzes  
how the adoption of the new technology can be encouraged. The motivation of this thesis is 
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to contribute to the FAA’s policy making to achieve the successful adoption of ADS-B. 
 
1.2 Problem Statement 
This thesis analyzes the effect of incentive policies for encouraging user adoption. There are 
several approaches for this encouragement. The effects of the following four policies on 
equipage are examined in this thesis: (1) Acceleration of Operational Benefits, (2) Preferred 
Access, (3) Financial Incentives, and (4) Mandate Equipage.  
 
1.2.1 Acceleration of Operational Benefits 
The first policy to be analyzed is to accelerate operational benefits, which can be derived 
from applications of a new technology. The operational benefit can be increased by 
developing new applications or accelerating the implementation of applications. For example, 
the operational benefit of car navigation systems increased when the new application 
providing real-time traffic information to drivers was developed (Sugawara, 2007).  
 
1.2.2 Preferred Access 
The second policy is to provide preferred access to adopters of new technologies. Only users 
who adopt the technology can access additional capacity, new services, and so on. The 
benefit from preferred access decreases as adopters increase. When the number of adopters is 
small, they can receive a large benefit from preferred access. However, when many users 
adopt the technology, the benefit of preferred access should be shared and the benefit per user 
decreases. When all users adopt it, the benefit of the preferred access becomes zero. 
Therefore, preferred access can be an incentive for early adoption. An example of preferred 
access is that aircraft equipped with the equipment for the area Navigation (RNAV) can have 
priority access to Haneda airport in Tokyo, Japan during night time (Japanese Ministry of 
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Land, Infrastructure and Transport, 2005). 
 
1.2.3 Financial Incentive 
The third policy is financial incentive. When financial incentive is given only to early 
adopters, it can be an incentive for early adoption. While users can receive the operational 
benefit and the benefit from preferred access every year after adoption, the financial 
incentive can usually be received only once. Therefore, the financial incentive has the same 
effect as reducing initial cost of adoption.  
 
1.2.4 Mandate Equipage 
The last policy to increase adopters of new technologies is mandate equipage, which is 
usually required after a certain preparation period. When the mandate date is moved forward, 
the benefit of the new technology increases because adoption can be achieved early. On the 
other hand, the cost that users pay also increases. Therefore, this thesis analyzes the optimal 
timing of mandate equipage. 
 
1.3 Methodology 
The methodology that is used for policy analysis in this thesis is a system dynamics modeling, 
which can be used to analyze the dynamic change of many factors that relate with each other 
in the complex system.  
 
First, to understand how individual users adopt new technologies, the system dynamics 
model of the adoption of a new technology is developed. Then, to analyze the effect of each 
incentive policy described in section 1.2, each incentive is added to the model and the change 
of adoption behavior is observed.  
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Chapter 2 Technology Transition 
 
A lot of technologies have been developed to solve various challenges that current society 
faces. While some technologies have been adopted successfully, some technologies have 
failed to be adopted even though the technology itself was innovative and valuable. This 
chapter describes the barriers to technology transition and the incentives for encouraging it. 
 
2.1 Barriers to Technology Transition 
There are several barriers to achieving a successful technology transition. The first is the 
mismatch of the distribution of costs and benefits among stakeholders. Figure 2-1 shows the 
framework for analysis of cost-benefit distribution (Marais and Weigel, 2006). When the 
stakeholder who receives benefits and the stakeholder who bears costs are the same, it is easy 
to achieve a transition as long as the benefits are larger than the costs. However, when the 
stakeholder who can receive benefits is different from the stakeholder who bears costs, it is 
difficult to incentivize the adoption. For example, in Figure 2-1, while the first stakeholder 
(stk1) can receive benefits without paying any costs, the n
th stakeholder (stkn) cannot receive 
any benefits in spite of paying costs. There is, therefore, no incentive for stkn to pay the costs.  
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Figure 2-1: Cost-Benefit Distribution across Stakeholders (Marais and Weigel, 2006) 
 
Even within the same stakeholder group, a problem of a group behavior paradox may occur 
(Olson, 1984). When members of a stakeholder group are large and the benefit should be 
shared, the incentive to pay a cost is limited. When one member in a group pays a cost and a 
benefit becomes available, the member who bears the cost can receive only small part of the 
benefit. On the other hand, other members in the same stakeholder group can receive the 
benefit without paying any costs. This is a free-rider problem. As the size of group increases, 
the incentive to pay costs decreases.  
 
The second barrier is a time lag between costs and benefits. Investors prefer immediate 
benefits. However, the benefit sometimes becomes available only in the future. The present 
value of future benefits is less than immediate benefits because of the time value of money.  
 
The third barrier is an uncertainty of future benefits. When the future benefit is uncertain, the 
value of the future benefit is reduced. Figure 2-2 shows this uncertainty (Mozdzanowska et 
al., 2007). There are two types of uncertainty. One is the uncertainty of the level of the future 
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benefit. And the other is the uncertainty of the timing of the future benefit. 
 
 
Figure 2-2: Uncertainty of Future Benefits (Mozdzanowska et al., 2007) 
 
2.2 Incentives for Technology Transition 
In order to encourage early adoption of new technologies, there are several policy options of 
incentives for equipage. According to Marais and Weigel, there are four general approaches 
to encourage adoption of a new technology: (1) Infrastructure and Development Support, (2) 
Technology value, (3) Positive incentives, and (4) Mandates and punitive measures (Marais 
and Weigel, 2006).  
 
First, ground infrastructure should be deployed to achieve the benefit of new technologies 
such as ADS-B. In order to encourage the adoption, the government has to convince users 
that the benefit of a new technology will be available. When the implementation schedule of 
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ground infrastructure is unclear, the value of the future benefit is reduced because of the 
uncertainty. Therefore, the government has to show a clear schedule of implementation.  
 
The second approach is to increase the value of a technology itself, which is derived from the 
development of applications. For example, the technology value of ADS-B is the operational 
benefit from applications. The FAA may increase the technology value by accelerating the 
development of applications or developing new applications.  
 
Thirdly, when the technology value itself is not enough to encourage adoption, positive 
incentives may be used. In this thesis, two types of positive incentives are examined. The 
first is to give preferred access. The other is to give financial incentive.  
 
The last approach increasing adoption is mandate, which is an effective way to increase 
adopters. However, when mandate is introduced rapidly without consensus of stakeholders, 
strong resistance may be raised. In addition, when the mandate requires hurried adoption, the 
total cost of adoption may increase.  
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Chapter 3 Automatic Dependent Surveillance – Broadcast 
 
3.1 ADS-B System 
ADS-B is a new surveillance technology for the Next Generation Air Transportation System 
(NextGen). Figure 3-1 shows the ADS-B system architecture. The system is composed of 
satellite positioning services, aircraft avionics and ground infrastructure. The equipped 
aircraft broadcasts the position information automatically. Aircraft use the position 
information from a satellite positioning service, such as Global Positioning System (GPS). 
This position information is transmitted to ground infrastructure (air-to-ground data link) and 
other equipped aircraft (air-to-air data link). This capability is called ADS-B Out. The 
information received by ground infrastructure is transmitted to air traffic control (ATC) 
facilities to be used for air traffic surveillance. The equipped aircraft that receive the 
information from other aircraft or ATC can display the data on a display unit such as Cockpit 
Display of Traffic Information (CDTI). This capability is called ADS-B In.    
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Figure 3-1: ADS-B System Architecture 
 
ADS-B is “automatic” because aircraft transmit position information without any external 
interrogations unlike TCAS and SSR, which send data in response to interrogations. ADS-B 
is “dependent” because it relies on position sources and onboard transmission system. The 
accuracy of the ADS-B system depends on the satellite position sources. 
 
3.2 Current Surveillance Technology 
Current surveillance service in the National Airspace System (NAS) is based on the radar 
information. The radar system consists of primary and secondary surveillance radars. The 
Satellite Positioning Service 
(GPS) 
Aircraft Avionics 
GPS Receiver Display Unit (CDTI) 
Onboard Transceiver 
Other Equipped 
Aircraft 
Ground Infrastructure 
Ground Station ATC Facilities 
Air-to-Air 
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primary surveillance radar (PSR) recognizes the position of aircraft by receiving the radio 
wave reflected from the surface of aircraft. PSR requires no special equipment aboard the 
aircraft. PSR sometimes cannot distinguish aircraft because it receives the reflected wave 
from objects other than aircraft, for example birds, mountains, clouds, and so on. PSR 
calculates the distance by measuring the time from sending wave to receiving reflected wave.  
 
A secondary surveillance radar (SSR) transmits interrogation pulse to aircraft. When a 
transponder aboard the aircraft receives interrogation, it replies the aircraft information. 
Therefore, aircraft must be equipped with transponder so that SSR system works. Unlike 
PSR, SSR can identify aircraft because transponder on board aircraft sends the unique code 
assigned to aircraft.     
 
There are some gaps of radar coverage of the continental U.S. at low altitude. The reasons of 
the gaps of radar coverage is the geographically restriction, such as mountain area, or 
cost-effective manner, such as remote area. Outside radar coverage, the separation between 
aircraft should be large. 
 
3.3 ADS-B History 
There have been some trials of ADS-B technology in the U.S. One of the trails was 
conducted at UPS’s hub airport in Louisville, KY. The FAA and UPS have been working 
together to develop ADS-B for a decade. The ADS-B operation at Louisville airport was 
approved by the FAA in January 2008. This is the first satellite-guided merging and spacing 
during approaches in the U.S. In addition, the approval enables the CTDI assisted visual 
separation, which allows aircraft to continue visual approach even when visibility drops 
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below requirement, and Surface Area Movement Management (Hughes, 2008).  
 
Another trial is Capstone program in Alaska. Alaska Capstone program was an early 
demonstration of ADS-B capability. The reasons why Alaska was chosen as a demonstration 
of the new technology were lack of radar coverage, harsh weather, and so on. According to 
the information published by the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health, 
accident rates in Alaska were up to 400 percent above the national average (Federal Aviation 
Administration, 2001). Phase I of Capstone program was in Yukon-Kuskokwim (Y-K) Delta. 
Phase II extended to Southeast Alaska. The Capstone program enabled surveillance outside 
radar coverage and increased onboard situation awareness. According to FAA accident 
statistics, the Capstone program reduced the aircraft fatal accident rate by 45% (Federal 
Aviation Administration, 2007a). 
 
3.4 Future of ADS-B 
The FAA breaks down the ADS-B implementation schedule into four segments. The first 
segment (2006-2010) includes building ground stations as shown in Figure 3-2. These area 
include TIS-B/FIS-B only coverage. Only Louisville, Philadelphia, the Gulf of Mexico, 
Ontario will have ADS-B ground based transceivers (GBTs).  
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Figure 3-2: Segment 1 Coverage (Federal Aviation Administration, 2006) 
 
Segment 2 (2009-2014) includes completing ground station coverage of the US in existing 
SSR airspace. Aircraft equipage will increase up to 40%. Segment 2 also includes finalizing 
the ADS-B Out definition. Segment 3 (2015-2020) includes 100% aircraft equipage of 
ADS-B Out. The definition of ADS-B In will be finalized in Segment 3. Segment 4 includes 
that legacy surveillance equipment such as SSR will be decommissioned. Applications of 
ADS-B will be fully implemented (Federal Aviation Administration, 2006).  
 
The FAA issued the notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM) about ADS-B Out on October 5, 
2007 (Federal Aviation Administration, 2007a) and accepted public comments until March 3, 
2008. The NPRM proposed the performance requirement for avionics equipment. In the 
NPRM, the FAA also proposed the mandate equipage of ADS-B Out by January 1, 2020.  
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3.5 Ground Infrastructure 
To achieve the benefit of ADS-B, the deployment of ground infrastructure is essential. In 
August 2007, FAA awarded a performance-based contract to a consortium led by ITT 
Corporation. The contractor will install and maintain the ground equipment necessary to 
provide ADS-B uplink and downlink to ATC. According to the FAA’s schedule, all ground 
infrastructures will be placed where current surveillance exists by end of fiscal year 2013.   
 
3.6 Benefit 
There are two types of operational benefit of ADS-B: the independent benefit that is 
independent of other aircraft’s equipage, Bi (t), and the dependent benefit that depends on 
other aircraft’s equipage, Bd (t). The benefit per aircraft per year can be described as follows: 
  
Benefit/Aircraft (t) = Bi (t) + Bd (t) 
 
3.6.1 Independent Benefits 
The independent benefit, Bi(t) increases over time because more applications will be 
developed. The following five applications are the applications of the independent benefit 
type. These applications are based on the assumptions of ADS-B Out application by the FAA 
(Federal Aviation Administration, 2007b). However, these applications do not include all 
applications that the FAA is planning to implement. 
 
a) More efficient en route conflict resolution 
Improved accuracy and update rate of surveillance allows reduction in potential conflict 
warning (8nm to 7nm). The benefit from the reduced conflict warnings is calculated as a 
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product of the number of prevented warning, the percentage of warnings that are acted 
upon, and the average cost of a prevented vector maneuver. The average cost of prevented 
vector maneuver is estimated from the distance of maneuver, and average speed.  
 
b) More efficient ATC-based merging and spacing due to improved surveillance  
Increased ability of merging and spacing (M&S) enables Continuous Descent Approach 
(CDA) in higher demand area. The benefit of CDA is calculated from average fuel saving. 
 
c) More efficient en route metering to the arrival fix 
The improved accuracy and update rate increases the capability of controller automation 
called Traffic Management Advisor (TMA), which optimizes arrival flows into busy 
airports. ADS-B can reduce the uncertainty of the meter fix arrival time. The reduced 
meter fix uncertainty can lead to the increase of runway throughput. 
 
d) More efficient ATC management of surface movement 
The FAA is upgrading ASDE-3 to ASDE-X. ASDE-X can increase some surface 
efficiency: 1) improved identification of aircraft within a queue, 2) improved ability to 
perform conformance monitoring, 3) improved surface surveillance during heavy 
precipitation, and 4) improved ATC confidence in surface surveillance date.  
 
e) Optimal routing 
ADS-B can provide radar-like separation in non-Radar Airspace. The radar-like separation 
permits the flights of additional more efficient routes. As a result, the aircraft can reduce 
the flight distance and flight hour. 
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3.6.2 Dependent Benefits 
The second type of benefit is the benefit depending on %Equipage. The dependent benefit 
can be described as the function of % equipage as follows: 
  
Benefit/Aircraft (t) = Bi (t) + Bd (t)= Bi (t) + Bdmax ×%Equipage(t) 
 
The following two applications are the applications of dependent benefit type. These 
applications are also based on the assumption by the FAA (FAA, 2007b), but do not include 
all applications that the FAA is planning to implement. 
 
a) More efficient separation en route 
The radar-like separation in non-radar area can reduce the separation and increase sector 
capacity. The FAA announces that the initial separation will be limited to selected altitudes, 
but widens to most altitudes above 24000 feet after ADS-B Out equipage increases. 
Therefore, the benefit from the more efficient separation depends on % equipage. 
 
b) Optimal routing 
The optimal routing can lead to the increased capacity. The benefit from increased 
capacity depends on other aircraft’s equipage. The capacity will not increase when only 
small number of aircraft adopt. When more aircraft adopt, the capacity increases more. 
Therefore, this application depends on % equipage. 
 
3.6.3 Assumption for Value of Benefit 
The FAA calculated the benefits of each application of ADS-B and the result is published on 
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the FAA’s website (Federal Aviation Administration, 2007b). The methodology that the FAA 
used to estimate the benefits is based on the “Economic Value for Evaluation of Federal 
Aviation Administration Investment and Regulatory Programs”. Economic value is derived 
from reduced flight hours. The economic value of reduced flight hours is quantified in terms 
of the aircraft direct operating cost (ADOC) and the Passenger Value of Time (PVT). Direct 
operating cost is fuel, crew and maintenance. PVT per aircraft type is based on average 
number of seats and average load factors. The average economic value of ADOC and PVT is 
shown in Table 3-1.  
 
Table 3-1: Assumption of Economic Value (Federal Aviation Administration, 2007b) 
ADOC –airborne (per hour) $2814 
ADOC –ground (per hour) $1411 
ADOC –block(per hour) $2596 
ADOC –Average(per hour) $2274 
PVT (per hour) $28.60 
PVT (per aircraft-hour) $1966 
 
Figure 3-3 shows the equipage curve that FAA and ARC used as the assumption for the 
benefit estimation. 
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Figure 3-3: Assumption of Equipage Curve (Federal Aviation Administration, 2007b) 
The FAA calculated the present value as of 2007 of the benefit of each application from 2007 
through 2035. This benefit includes ADOC, which is the benefit for aircraft operators, and 
PVT, which is the benefit for passengers.  The present value of the benefit for airlines is 
estimated by subtracting PVT. Table 3-2 also shows the first year when the benefit will be 
realized.  
 
Table 3-2: Assumption of Benefit and First Year Benefit Realized (ADS-B Aviation 
Rulemaking Committee, 2007) 
Application Benefit for airlines 
(PV $Million) 
First Year benefit 
realized 
More efficient en route conflict resolution $433.0 2017 
Increased ability to allow CDAs $429.8 2014 
More efficient en route metering to the arrival fix $225.2 2020 
More efficient ATC management of surface movement $14.5 2016 
Increased capacity $247.9 2011 
Optimal routing $46.7 2011 
[year] 
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Using the above information, the independent benefit per aircraft per year and the dependent 
benefit per aircraft per year can be calculated. Figure 3-4 and Figure 3-5 shows the 
Independent Benefit per aircraft per year and Dependent Benefit per aircraft per year 
respectively. 
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         (note) Estimated from the FAA assumption for the benefit of ADS-B Out 
Figure 3-4: Independent Benefit per Aircraft per Year 
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(note) Estimated from the FAA assumption for the benefit of ADS-B Out 
Figure 3-5: Dependent Benefit per Aircraft per Year 
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3.7 Cost 
For an aircraft operator, the unit cost of acquisition of ADS-B Out is mainly composed of 
GPS, augmentation, and transponder. Because older aircraft are not equipped with GPS, the 
acquisition cost of ADS-B is high. On the other hand, because new aircraft are already 
equipped with GPS, the acquisition cost is less expensive. Furthermore, when aircraft are 
already equipped with upgradable transponder, the cost is much less expensive.   
 
Therefore, the cost of adoption of ADS-B Out varies based on aircraft age. Aircraft can be 
divided into 3 types based on aircraft age. This categorization is estimated from the 
assumption used by the FAA (Federal Aviation Administration, 2008). Type A is the oldest 
aircraft group, which does not have GPS or Transponder. Type B is the middle age aircraft 
group, which has GPS and upgradable transponder. Type C is the newest aircraft type. The 
unit cost of Type A includes the GPS with augmentation and transponder. The unit cost of 
Type B includes the augmentation and transponder upgrade. The unit cost of Type C includes 
the augmentation upgrade. Aircraft of Type A was delivered between 1983 and 1998. Aircraft 
of Type B was delivered between 1998 and 2008. Aircraft of Type C will be delivered after 
2008. 
Table 3-3: Aircraft Type by Aircraft Age (Federal Aviation Administration, 2008) 
 Type A Type B Type C 
GPS × ○ ○ 
Augmentation × × × 
Transponder(DO-260A) × △(upgradable) ○ 
Deliveries 1983-1998 1998-2008 2008- 
Unit cost $150,000 $70,000 $32,000 
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The cost of acquisition of ADS-B Out also depends on the regular maintenance cycle. There 
are several types of maintenance checks of aircraft. The light maintenance is done every 
month or every a few months, and usually finished overnight. The heavy maintenance is done 
every 4 or 5 years. Because the heavy maintenance check requires a lot of space and time, the 
aircraft have to be out of service during the maintenance.  
 
It takes some time to install ADS-B Out. Therefore, when aircraft adopt ADS-B Out outside 
the heavy maintenance cycle, the aircraft must be taken out of operation. As a result, the cost 
for the adoption of ADS-B Out becomes more expensive when aircraft adopt ADS-B Out 
outside the heavy maintenance cycle. Therefore, the maintenance cycle is an important factor 
for the decision about when aircraft operators adopt the ADS-B Out. 
 
The other cost of implementation of ADS-B is the cost for FAA to deploy ground 
infrastructure. On the other hand, maintenance cost for ADS-B will be less expensive than 
that for the current radar-based surveillance system. ADS-B ground infrastructure does not 
have moving parts while radar system has rotating antenna and additional system complexity 
including calibrator.  
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Chapter 4 Modeling 
 
This chapter describes the modeling of how aircraft operators make a decision about the 
adoption of ADS-B Out and how the benefit of ADS-B Out changes. Aircraft operators adopt 
ADS-B Out based on the benefits they can receive and the costs they have to pay. On the 
other hand, the benefits of ADS-B Out depend on how many aircraft are equipped with 
ADS-B Out. Benefits and equipage relate with each other and change dynamically.  
 
The benefit of ADS-B Out has been calculated by FAA and ADS-B Aviation Rulemaking 
Committee (ARC). This benefit is calculated based on the assumption of equipage curve. 
However, the equipage curve changes as the benefit of ADS-B Out changes. Therefore, the 
system dynamics model can be used to represent these complex dynamic changes.  
 
4.1 System Dynamics Modeling 
System dynamics modeling is a tool that enables understanding the structure of complex 
systems where many factors relate with each other, to build computer simulations model of 
complex systems, and to design more effective policies. System dynamics can be used for 
both qualitative and quantitative analysis. (Sterman, 2000) 
 
The feedback loop is a core concept of a system dynamics model. There are two types of 
feedback loops: reinforcing (positive) loops and balancing (negative) loops. The reinforcing 
loop is shown in Figure 4-1. When factor A increases, factor B also increases. When factor B 
increases, factor A increases more. The behavior of each factor in reinforcing loop increases 
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or decreases exponentially. Reinforcing loop works as either virtuous circle or vicious circle.  
Factor A
Factor B +
+
R
      
Structure                          Behavior 
Figure 4-1: Reinforcing (Positive) Loop 
 
Another feedback loop is a balancing (negative) loop. The balancing loop is shown in Figure 
4-2. When factor C increases, factor D also increases. When factor D increases, factor C 
decreases. The behavior of each factor in a balancing loop is goal-seeking. Whatever the 
initial values of the factor C and D are, the factors reach to the equilibrium point.  
Factor C
Factor D +
-
B
   
Structure                        Behavior 
Figure 4-2: Balancing (Negative) Loop 
 
 
time 
Factor C,D 
goal 
time 
Factor A, B 
 31 
4.2 Basic Model of ADS-B Out Equipage 
This section describes the basic model of ADS-B Out equipage. Aircraft operators make a 
decision about whether or not to adopt ADS-B Out and when to adopt ADS-B Out based on 
benefits and costs. At the same time, in order to achieve the benefit of ADS-B Out, there are 
three factors to be satisfied: ground infrastructure, applications, and aircraft equipage. Some 
applications also require the equipage of other aircraft.  
 
The model is mainly composed of two parts: Adoption Model and Benefit Model. The input 
of the Benefit Model is the ground infrastructure, applications and % equipage, and the 
output is the current and estimated future benefits. The input of the Adoption Model is 
benefits and costs, and the output is % equipage. 
Adoption
Model
Benefit
Model
% Equipage
Ground
Infrastructure
+
+
+
+
R
Cost
-
Applications
+
 
Figure 4-3: General Concept for Model of ADS-B Out Equipage 
 
There is one reinforcing loop. When % equipage increases, benefits of ADS-B Out increase. 
When benefits increase, more aircraft adopt ADS-B Out and % equipage increases more. 
This reinforcing loop is the major driver of increase of the adopter of ADS-B Out.  
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Figure 4-4 shows the basic model of ADS-B adoption. The following section describes the 
detail of the basic model. 
Aircraft without ADS-B Aircraft with ADS-B
Fractional
Adoption Rate
Adoption Rate
+ +
% Equipage (t)
- +
B
R
Attractiveness of
Early Adoption
+
NPV of early
adoption
NPV of future
adoption
+ -
Cost
r
-
-
- -
Dependent
Benefit (t)
+
Benefit (t)
+
+ +
Independent
Benefit (t)
+
Bdmax
+
 
Figure 4-4: Basic Model of ADS-B Out Equipage 
 
4.2.1 Adoption Model 
As shown in Figure 4-4, all aircraft are divided into two stocks: Aircraft without ADS-B and 
Aircraft with ADS-B. The equation for the number of aircraft with ADS-B, the number of 
aircraft without ADS-B and the adoption rate in year t is: 
# of Aircraft with ADS-B = ∫ Adoption rate(t) dt; 
# of Aircraft without ADS-B = Initial value - ∫ Adoption rate(t) dt; and 
Adoption Rate = # of Aircraft without ADS-B × Fractional Adoption Rate. 
The unit of Adoption Rate is aircraft/year, and the unit of Fractional Adoption Rate is 1/year. 
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The attractiveness of early adoption is based on the differences between Net Present Value 
(NPV) of early adoption and of future adoption.  
 
NPV is a major criterion for the investment decision. When they make a decision about 
investment, 75% of firms always or almost always calculate NPV (Franklin et al., 2006). As 
NPV is the difference between the present value of the future benefits and costs, NPV can be 
calculated as follows: 
 
 ∑ ∑ ∑
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+
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+
=
t t t
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r
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Above, CF(t) is the cash flow at time t and r is the discount rate.  
 
In general, when a project has positive NPV, companies are assumed to invest in the project. 
However, a positive NPV does not mean that it is best undertaken now. It might be even more 
valuable if undertaken in the future. Therefore, in order to invest a project now, there are two 
conditions. One is that NPV should be positive, and the other is that NPV of current 
investment should be larger than NPV of future investment. 
 
However, because equipage of ADS-B Out will be mandate in the future, positive NPV is not 
necessarily required for the adoption of ADS-B Out. The aircraft have to adopt ADS-B Out 
sooner or later even if NPV is negative. A question for aircraft operators is when the optimal 
timing of adoption is.  
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This System Dynamics model calculates NPV of early adoption and future adoption at each 
unit time step and compares these NPV so that aircraft operators who have not yet adopted 
ADS-B Out make a decision whether or not they adopt ADS-B Out at the time step.  
 
When NPVk(t) is defined as NPV as of year t when aircraft adopt ADS-B Out k years later, 
that is to say the adoption in year t+k, NPVk(t) can be calculated as follows: 
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Above, R is the aircraft retirement year. The aircraft can receive the benefit after adoption 
ADS-B Out until the aircraft retires. Aircraft have to pay unit acquisition costs when aircraft 
adopt. 
 
 
Figure 4-5: Definition of NPVk(t) 
 
In order to adopt in year t, NPV of adoption in year t should be larger than any NPV of future 
year t t+k t+k+1 R 
C 
 
Bt+k+1 
BR 
0 
Benefit/aircraft/year 
Retire 
Adopt 
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adoption between year t and the mandate date: 
  
)()(0 tNPVtNPV k> , (k=1, 2, ・・・, T - t). 
 
Above, T is the mandate date. Therefore, the difference between NPV of adoption in year t 
and NPV of future adoption k years later should be positive:  
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Figure 4-6: NPV0(t) - NPVk(t) 
 
While the advantage of early adoption in year t, compared to adoption in year t+k, is to 
receive the benefit between year t and t+k, the advantage to wait for the equipage until year 
t+k is the differences between C and krC )1( + . In other words, if aircraft operators wait for 
the equipage until year t+k and invest the money (C) in another project or financial product 
t t+1 
Bt+1 
Bt+2 
Bt+k 
0 t+2 t+k 
C(1+r)k-C 
year 
Benefit/aircraft/year 
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of the same risk until year t+k, the aircraft operator can receive CrC k −+ )1(  in year t+k. 
This is the opportunity cost of early adoption. If the advantage of early adoption is larger than 
the advantage to wait, the aircraft invest in year t.  
 
For example, the difference between NPV of adoption in year t and adoption 2 years later can 
be calculated as follows. 
 
Cash flow of Investment in year t 
Year t t+1 t+2 t+3 ・・・ R 
Benefit  Bt+1 Bt+2 Bt+3 ・・・ BR 
Cost -C      
NPV0(t) -C +Bt+1/(1+r) +B t+2/(1+r)
2 +B t+3/(1+r)
3 ・・・ +BR/(1+r)R-t 
 
Cash flow of Investment 2 years later (in year t+2) 
Year t t+1 t+2 t+3 ・・・ R 
Benefit    Bt+3 ・・・ BR 
Cost   -C    
NPV2(t)   -C/(1+r)
2 +B t+3/(1+r)
3 ・・・ +BR/(1+r)R-t 
 
The difference between NPV of adoption in year t and adoption 2 years later is: 
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Attractiveness(t) can be defined as the minimum differences of NPV0(t) and NPVk(t) of any 
future date until the mandate date:  
 Attractiveness(t) = min{ NPV0(t) – NPVk(t)}, (k = 1, 2, ・・・, T – t). 
Above, T is the mandate date. 
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Fractional Adoption Rate is a function of Attractiveness(t). Aircraft operators are assumed to 
adopt ADS-B Out when Attractiveness(t) is larger than the minimum requirement of 
attractiveness for early adoption. However, the minimum requirement of attractiveness for 
adoption depends on the willingness of early adoption and is different according to aircraft 
operators because the fleet configuration and operational pattern is different. The minimum 
requirement of attractiveness for early adoption can be modeled as a normal distribution 
centered around the average minimum requirement of attractiveness for adoption, A* with 
standard deviation σ. Below, A is Attractiveness(t): 
 
 Minimum required attractiveness = )
2
)(
exp(
2
1
2
2*
σπσ
AA−
− . 
 
The fractional adoption rate can be calculated as cumulative distribution function: 
  
Fractional adoption rate = ∫
−
− dA
AA
)
2
*)(
exp(
2
1
2
2
σπσ
. 
 
Figure 4-7: Definition of Fractional Adoption Rate 
Attractiveness, A 
1 
Attractiveness, A 
Minimum required 
Attractiveness for adoption 
Fractional 
Adoption Rate 
A* A
* 
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4.2.2 Benefit Model 
As mentioned in section 3.6, there are two types of operational benefits: the independent 
benefit that is independent of other aircraft’s equipage, Bi (t), and the dependent benefit that 
depends on other aircraft’s equipage, Bd (t): 
 
 Benefit/Aircraft (t) = Bi (t) + Bd (t)= Bi (t) + Bdmax ×%Equipage(t). 
 
The independent benefit, Bi (t) increases over time because more applications will be 
developed. As described in section 3.6.3, the independent benefit increases as shown in 
Figure 4-8.  
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Figure 4-8: Independent Benefit per Aircraft 
In this model, Bi (t) is assumed to increase linearly over time. The equation of Bi (t) is: 
Bi(t) 51754232571)2013(
20132020
18000
−×=−×
−
= tt     )2013( ≥t  
 Bi(t) = 0                                        (t < 2013). 
From section 3.6.3, the equation of the benefit depending on other aircraft equipage, Bd(t) is: 
 Bd(t) = Bdmax × %Equipage(t) = 4000 × %Equipage(t) )2011( ≥t  
Bd(t) = 0                                         (t < 2011) . 
[$/aircraft/year] Independent Benefit/Aircraft/year 
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The unit of Bi (t), Bd (t) is dollar per aircraft per year. The aircraft with ADS-B can receive 
the benefit, Bi (t) + Bd (t), every year.  
  
In order to calculate NPV in the Adoption Model, future benefits should be estimated. With 
the above definition equation, Bi(t) can be calculated. Because the Bd (t) depends on % 
equipage, future % equipage should be estimated first. The % equipage in mandate date 
should be 100%. Therefore, the future % equipage between time t and the mandate date can 
be estimated by linear interpolation. Then the future benefit between time t and the mandate 
date can be calculated by using the estimated % equipage. 
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Figure 4-9: Estimation of Future Benefit 
 
4.3 Further Expansion of the Model 
The basic model developed in section 4.2 can show the basic idea of the Adoption Model and 
the Benefit Model. But it is too simple to represent the real ADS-B Out equipage. Three 
factors should be added to the basic model. The first is the maintenance cycle of aircraft, the 
second is the aircraft age, and the third is the deployment of ground infrastructure. 
 
Time mandate t 0 
%Equipage 
E(t) 
100
% 
Interpolation 
%Equipage 
Benefit 
100% E(t) 0 
Benefit (t) 
Bmax 
Bi 
mandate t 0 
Benefit 
Benefit (t) 
Time 
Estimated 
Bmax 
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4.3.1 Cost and Maintenance Cycle 
As mentioned in section 3.7, the acquisition cost of ADS-B Out depends on the regular 
maintenance cycle. The cost for the adoption of ADS-B Out becomes more expensive when 
aircraft adopt ADS-B Out outside the heavy maintenance cycle.  
 
As mentioned in 4.2.1, adoption rate is determined by the comparison of the NPV between 
the early adoption and the future adoption. The NPV varies according to the maintenance 
cycle. Therefore, the adoption rate should be calculated separately based on the position of 
aircraft in the maintenance cycle. Figure 4-10 shows the model that takes into account the 
factor of the maintenance cycle. 
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Aircraft without ADS-B Out
Heavy Maintenance next year
Aircraft with ADS-B Out
Adoption Rate1
+
% Equipage
+
Aircraft without ADS-B Out
Heavy Maintenance 2 years later
Aircraft without ADS-B Out
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Figure 4-10: Adoption Model by Maintenance Cycle 
 
This model assumes that each aircraft receives a heavy maintenance visit every five years. 
Therefore, the aircraft without ADS-B Out are divided into five stocks, each of which 
represents the aircraft group of each position in the maintenance cycle: Aircraft that receive 
the heavy maintenance this year, 1 year later, 2 years later, 3 years later and 4 years later. 
Every year, aircraft move stocks from 4 years later to 3 years later, from 3 years later to 2 
years later, from 2 years later to 1 year later, from 1 year later to this year, and from this year 
to 4 years later.  
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Adoption rate for each stock is calculated separately.   
a) Heavy maintenance in year t 
When aircraft receives regular heavy maintenance in year t, the NPV of adoption in year t is 
as follows: 
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NPV of future adoption (k years later) is as follows: 
 Future adoption in the future maintenance cycle 
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Above, AC is the additional cost when aircraft adopt ADS-B out of the maintenance cycle. 
The differences of NPV between adoption in year t and the future adoption k years later are:  
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The attractiveness of the adoption in year t is the minimum differences between NPV of the 
adoption in year t and the future adoption k years later. The differences between NPV of the 
adoption in year t and the future adoption usually become the smallest when aircraft 
operators compare the adoption in year t and the future adoption in the next maintenance 
cycle. 
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b) No heavy maintenance in year t 
When aircraft does not receive regular heavy maintenance in year t, the NPV of adoption in 
year t is as follows: 
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NPV of future adoption (k years later) is as follows: 
 Future adoption in the future maintenance cycle 
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Future adoption out of the future maintenance cycle 
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The differences of NPV between adoption in year t and the future adoption (k years later) is:  
Future adoption in the future maintenance cycle  
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 Future adoption out of the future maintenance cycle  
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Basically, aircraft operators compare the NPV of the adoption in year t and the NPV of the 
adoption in next maintenance cycle. When the benefit before the next maintenance is larger 
than the opportunity cost and the additional cost of the adoption outside the maintenance 
cycle, the aircraft operator adopts ADS-B Out this year with paying the additional cost rather 
than waiting until the next maintenance cycle.  
 
4.3.2 Cost and Aircraft Age 
As mentioned in section 3.7, the cost of adoption of ADS-B Out varies based on aircraft age. 
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Therefore, the adoption rate should be calculated separately according aircraft age. In this 
model, aircraft is divided into 3 types based on aircraft age as shown in Table 3-3. 
  
Figure 4-11 shows the adoption model that takes into account the aircraft age and is 
composed of 3 adoption models: adoption models for Type A, B and C. Type A is the oldest 
aircraft, which do not have GPS or transponder. Type B is the middle age aircraft, which have 
GPS and upgradable transponder. Type C is the newest aircraft. The adoption model of each 
aircraft type represents the adoption model in Figure 4-10. The adoption rate of Type A, B 
and C is calculated by using the unit cost of the aircraft of Type A, B and C respectively.  
Type A
Type B
Type C
Aircraft with
ADS-B
Purchase
Adoption Rate A
Adoption Rate C
Adoption Rate B
Retire
 
Figure 4-11: Adoption Model by Aircraft Age 
4 years
3 year
2 years
1 year
this year
4 years
3 year
2 years
1 year
this year
4 years
3 year
2 years
1 year
this year
Type A 
Type B 
Type C 
Adoption Model 
for Type A 
Adoption Model 
for Type B 
Adoption Model 
for Type C 
 46 
 
This model assumes that all aircraft retire when 25 years old. Because the youngest aircraft 
of Type A is 10 years old in 2008, all aircraft of Type A will retire in 15 years. Therefore, the 
retirement rate of Type A is 1/15 of the number of aircraft of Type A. This model assumes 
that the total number of aircraft does not change. The number of new purchased aircraft of 
Type C for each year is the same as the number of retired aircraft of Type A.  
 
4.3.3 Deployment of Ground Infrastructure 
To achieve the benefit of ADS-B, ground infrastructure is required as well as aircraft 
equipage. According to the current FAA’s schedule, ground Infrastructure will be deployed 
by the end of fiscal year 2013. Before 2013, ground infrastructure will be deployed by steps 
geographically. This model assumes that ground infrastructure will be deployed in 4 steps by 
2014. The first step of deployment of ground infrastructure is the location included in the 
segment 1 as shown in Figure 3-2. During the segment 2, the FAA is planning to deploy the 
ground infrastructure all over the NAS. The current schedule by ITT is shown in Figure 4-13. 
The ITT plans to deploy the ground infrastructure all over the NAS in 3 steps between 2012 
and 2014. According to the deployment schedule of ITT, the ground infrastructure will be 
deployed from east to west based on the traffic density. 
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Figure 4-12: Deployment Schedule of ADS-B Ground Infrastructure (Hu, 2008) 
 
When the deployment of ground infrastructure is taken into account, benefit per aircraft can 
be defined as follows: 
 
Benefit(t) = G(t) × (Bi (t) + Bd (t)). 
 
When G(t) is the % operation exposed to ADS-B, Figure 4-13 shows the G(t). 
2012 
2013 
2014 
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Figure 4-13: Definition of G(t) 
 
4.3.4 Summary of Assumptions 
The following is the summary of the assumption of this model.  
・The mandate date of ADS-B Out is 2020. 
・The target of this model is 2008 to 2020. 
・Bi(t) increases linearly over time. 
・The heavy maintenance cycle is 5 years. 
・All aircraft retire when 25 years old. 
・Total number of aircraft does not change. 
・Discount rate is 7%.
2012 2014 
100% 
Year 
% operation exposed to ADS-B 
2010 2013 
Segment 1 
Segment 2 
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Chapter 5 Policy Analysis 
 
This chapter describes the analysis of incentive policy for encouraging the early adoption of 
ADS-B Out by using the System Dynamics Model developed in Chapter 4. The following 
four policies are analyzed in this chapter: (1) Acceleration of Operational Benefit, (2) 
Preferred Access, (3) Financial Incentives, and (4) Mandate Date. 
  
5.1 Acceleration of Operational Benefits 
The first policy for encouraging the early adoption of ADS-B Out is to accelerate the 
operational benefit. This section focuses on accelerating the implementation of applications, 
rather than developing new applications. Also, this section does not include the acceleration 
of the benefits that are currently anticipated to be available after the mandate date. Because 
most of those benefits require the full equipage of all aircraft, it is difficult to accelerate the 
implementation of those applications before the mandate date. In this section, the mandate 
date is fixed in 2020. The effect of moving forward the mandate date will be discussed in 
section 5.4. 
 
There are two types of operational benefits of ADS-B Out: the independent benefit that is 
independent of other aircraft’s equipage, Bi (t) and the dependent benefit that depends on 
other aircraft’s equipage, Bd (t): 
 
 Benefit/Aircraft (t) = Bi (t) + Bd (t)= Bi (t) + Bdmax ×%Equipage(t). 
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Table 5-1 shows the anticipated accrual date for ADS-B Out benefits.    
 
Table 5-1: Accrual Date for ADS-B Out Application (ADS-B Aviation Rulemaking 
Committee, 2007) 
Application Type Accrual date 
More efficient en route conflict resolution 2017 
Increased ability to allow CDAs 2014 
More efficient en route metering to the arrival fix 2020 
More efficient ATC management of surface movement 2016 
Optimal routing  
Independent 
2011 
Increased capacity 2011 
Optimal routing  
Dependent  
2011 
 
Several applications of the independent benefit type are anticipated to gradually become 
available between 2011 and 2020. On the other hand, the applications of the dependent 
benefit type will become available in 2011. Therefore, this section focuses on the acceleration 
of implementation of the application of the independent benefit type.  
 
The independent benefit, Bi (t) increases over time because more applications will be 
developed, and is assumed to increase linearly over time. There are two types of acceleration 
of benefit as shown in Figure 5-1. One is the High Benefit Rate type and the other is the 
Early Benefit type. The following section examines each type of acceleration of benefit. 
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Figure 5-1: Types of Acceleration of Benefit 
 
5.1.1 Acceleration of Operational Benefits of High Benefit Rate Type 
The first acceleration of the benefits is to accelerate benefit without changing the first year 
benefit realized. In the baseline case, the benefits are available after 2014. Because the 
ground infrastructure will be deployed all over the NAS in 2014, the applications in this 
section are available only after ground infrastructure is deployed all over the NAS. Figure 5-2 
shows the acceleration of the benefit of High Benefit Rate type. In the baseline case, the 
benefit is zero until 2013 and reaches to the maximum benefit in 2020. In the 2-year 
acceleration case, the benefit reaches to the maximum benefit in 2018. And in the 4-year 
acceleration case, the benefit reaches the maximum benefit in 2016. In the 6-year 
acceleration case, the benefit reaches the maximum benefit in 2016. The benefit never 
exceeds the maximum benefit because the applications that are anticipated to be available 
after 2020 are not accelerated. 
year year 
Benefit/aircraft/year Benefit/aircraft/year 
(a) High Benefit Rate Type (b) Early Benefit Type 
Baseline Baseline 
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Figure 5-2: Acceleration of Benefit (High Benefit Rate Type) 
 
Figure 5-3 shows the change of the equipage curve. As the benefit is accelerated, the 
equipage curve is also accelerated. For example, when the benefit is accelerated by 6 years, 
the % equipage reaches 50% one year earlier than the baseline case.  
 
Figure 5-3 also shows the different equipage curves of different types of aircraft. Type A is 
the oldest type of aircraft and the acquisition cost is the most expensive. Type C is the 
youngest and the acquisition cost is the least expensive. The aircraft of type A is affected the 
most by acceleration of operational benefits. Type A aircraft requires higher benefits to adopt 
the ADS-B because of the higher acquisition costs. In the baseline case, type A aircraft do not 
begin adoption until 2015 while type B and type C aircraft begin adoption before 2014. 
When the benefit is accelerated, Type A aircraft begin adoption earlier than the baseline case.  
 
Benefit/aircraft/year 
Max benefit 
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Figure 5-3: Change of Equipage Curve by Acceleration of Benefit (High Benefit Rate 
Type)  
 
The total benefit per year is calculated as follows: 
 Total benefit (t) = benefit/aircraft (t) × # of aircraft equipped (t). 
The total benefit per year increases as the operational benefit is accelerated. 
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Figure 5-4: Change of Total Benefit by Acceleration of Benefit (High Benefit Rate Type) 
 
The present value (PV) of the total benefit from 2008 to 2020 is the good indicator to show 
the effect of incentives. 
 PV = ∑
=
−+
2020
2008
2008)1(
}(t)benefit  total{
t
t
r
 
 
The PV increases by $249 million when the benefit is accelerated by 6 years. 
 
Table 5-2: PV of Total Benefit by Acceleration of Benefit (High Benefit Rate Type) 
 Baseline 2year 4year 6year 
PV of benefit ($) 293M 368M 447M 542M 
 
5.1.2 Acceleration of Operational Benefits of Early Benefit Type 
The second acceleration is to move forward the first year when the benefit is realized by 
keeping the slope constant. Figure 5-5 shows the acceleration by sliding the slope.  
Total enefit/Year 
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Figure 5-5: Acceleration of Benefit (Early Benefit Type) 
 
According to the current FAA’s schedule, the ground infrastructure will be deployed all over 
the NAS by 2014. When the implementation of applications is accelerated before 2013, it is 
best to accelerate the deployment of ground infrastructure as well. However, because the 
schedule of deployment of ground infrastructure is determined by the contract between the 
FAA and the ITT Corporation, it is difficult to accelerate the schedule. The ground 
infrastructure will be deployed in steps before 2013. When the applications are accelerated 
before 2013, the benefit will be partially available only where ground infrastructure is placed.  
 
Figure 5-6 shows the change of the Equipage curve when the benefit is accelerated. In 
contrast to the acceleration of High Benefit Rate in 5.1.1, all types of aircraft are affected 
almost equally.  
Benefit/aircraft/year 
Max Benefit 
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Figure 5-6: Change of Equipage Curve by Acceleration of Benefit (Early Benefit Type) 
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The total benefit increases as the benefit is accelerated as shown in Figure 5-7. 
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Figure 5-7: Change of Total Benefit by Acceleration of Benefit (Early Benefit Type) 
 
Table 5-3 shows the PV of total benefit from 2008 to 2020 when the application is 
accelerated by sliding the slope. 
 
Table 5-3: PV of Total Benefit by Acceleration of Benefit (Early Benefit Type) 
 Baseline 1year 2year 3year 
PV of benefit ($) 293M 380M 484M 592M 
 
5.1.3 Comparison of Two Accelerations 
The acceleration of Early Benefit Type is more effective than the acceleration of High 
Benefit Rate Type. Although area A and B in Figure 5-8 is the same, the PV of total benefit of 
the acceleration of Early Benefit Type by 3 years is larger than that of the acceleration of 
High Benefit Type by 6 years.  
Total Benefit/Year 
 58 
 
Figure 5-8: Comparison of Two Types of Acceleration of Benefit 
 
The reason why the acceleration of Early Benefit Type is more effective is the delay in 
adoption. Even though the benefit increases sharply such as High Benefit Rate Type in Figure 
5-8, the % equipage cannot increase so sharply because aircraft adopt ADS-B Out in their 
maintenance cycle. An important thing is to begin adoption early. Therefore, Early Benefit 
type is more effective than High Benefit Rate type. It is effective in encouraging the early 
adoption of ADS-B Out to accelerate the implementation of some applications before ground 
infrastructure will be deployed all over the NAS. 
 
When the maintenance cycle is 3 years and 1 year, the change of the equipage curve is as 
shown in Figure 5-9. The shorter the maintenance cycle is, the faster the % equipage 
increases.  
 2010   2013  2014    2017      2020 year 
Benefit/aircraft/Year 
Baseline 
High Benefit Rate Type 
Early Benefit Type 
[$/aircraft/Year] 
A 
B 
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Figure 5-9: Change of Equipage Curve by Shortening Maintenance Cycle 
 
5.2 Preferred Access 
The second policy is to give the preferred access to the aircraft equipped with ADS-B Out. 
The benefit from preferred access decreases as %Equipage increases. The relation between 
the benefit from preferred access and %Equipage is as shown in Figure 5-10. The early 
adopter can receive the large benefit. When all aircraft are equipped, the benefit of preferred 
access is zero. 
 
  
Figure 5-10: Benefit from Preferred Access 
%Equipage 
Benefit/Aircraft/Year 
100% 
Maximum benefit from 
preferred access 
0 
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In order to analyze the effect of preferred access, the following two type of benefit from 
preferred access are examined. The first type is the maximum benefit from preferred access is 
half of the maximum independent benefit and starts from 2012. The other is the maximum 
benefit is the same as the maximum independent benefit and starts from 2014.  
 
Figure 5-11: Types of Benefit from Preferred Access 
 
Figure 5-12 shows the change of the equipage curve when the benefit from the preferred 
access is added to the baseline case. The benefit that starts from 2012 is more effective than 
the benefit that starts from 2014 except for type A aircraft.  
2020 2012 2014 
0.5 Max Independent Benefit 
Max Independent Benefit 
Year 
Benefit/Aircraft/Year 
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Figure 5-12: Change of Equipage Curve by Preferred Access 
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The total benefit per year is as shown in Figure 5-13.  
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Figure 5-13: Change of Total Benefit by Preferred Access 
 
5.3 Financial Incentives 
The third policy is financial incentive. The government should be careful when considering 
financial incentives because the incentives may distort the market mechanism. The financial 
incentive makes deadweight loss and decreases the market efficiency. Figure 5-14 shows how 
financial incentives create deadweight loss. When there are positive or negative externalities 
that can not be captured by market mechanism, financial incentive by the government can be 
justified. The examples of externalities are environmental externality, safety externality, 
security externality, etc. (Viscusi et al., 2005) 
 
 
fit/Year 
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Figure 5-14: Deadweight Loss by Financial Incentive 
 
ADS-B has environmental benefits. ADS-B can reduce the flight hour of aircraft operators 
and reduce the fuel consumption. While reduced fuel cost is the direct benefit for aircraft 
operator, it is also an environmental benefit. ADS-B also increases the safety level of 
operation. However, while increased safety is a benefit for passengers, the benefit from 
increased safety is sometimes difficult to be captured. 
 
Therefore, the financial incentive for the adoption of ADS-B can be justified by these 
externalities. The level of financial incentive should be calculated from the value of 
environmental externality and safety externality. While the estimation of the value for 
externality is out of the scope of thesis, this section analyzes the effect of the financial 
incentives on the equipage. 
 
Three types of financial incentive in Figure 5-15 are examined. Aircraft receive the financial 
incentive once when aircraft adopt ADS-B. Long&Low type incentive means that aircraft that 
adopt before 2018 can receive the financial incentive as much as half of the acquisition cost 
S 
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for type C aircraft, which is the youngest aircraft group. Short&Middle type incentive means 
that aircraft that adopt before 2013 can receive the financial incentive as much as the 
acquisition cost for type C aircraft. Short&High type incentive means that aircraft that adopt 
before 2013 can receive the financial incentive as much as the acquisition cost for type B 
aircraft, which is the middle age aircraft group. 
 
 
Figure 5-15: Types of Financial Incentives 
 
Figure 5-16 shows the change of the Equipage curve. The financial incentives of 
Short&Middle type are more effective in encouraging early adoption than that of Long&Low 
type. When the period of financial incentives is the same, Short&High type is more effective 
than Short&Middle type. 
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Figure 5-16: Change of Equipage Curve by Financial Incentive 
 
Figure 5-16 also shows the effects of financial incentive of each type aircraft. Type A is the 
oldest and acquisition cost of ADS-B is the most expenses. Type C is the newest type of 
aircraft and the acquisition cost is the least expensive. Type C is affected the most by the 
financial incentive. For aircraft of Type C, the effect of Short&High type incentive is almost 
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same as Short&Middle type. On the other hand, aircraft of Type A are affected only by the 
Short&High type incentive, not by Long&Low type and Short&Middle type. While the 
financial incentive of Short&Middle type is only 20% of the acquisition cost for Type A 
aircraft, the Short&High type incentive is almost half of acquisition cost for Type A aircraft.   
 
Therefore, the most effective way of financial incentive is to give Short&High type incentive 
to type A aircraft, and Short&Middle type incentive to type C aircraft. However, if the 
government gives different financial incentive to different aircraft based on aircraft age, this 
approach may raise an equity issue. 
 
The PV of total expense of FAA for financial incentives is shown in Table 5-4.  
 
Table 5-4: Total Expense of FAA for Financial Incentive 
 Long&Low Short&Middle Short&High 
PV of total expense of FAA $98M $144M $569M 
 
 
5.4 Mandate Equipage 
The last policy is mandate. Mandate is an efficient and assured way to increase the equipage. 
The FAA announces that the current plan of mandate is 2020. This section analyzes the effect 
of the changing mandate date.  
 
When the mandate date is moved forward, the equipage curve changes as shown in Figure 
5-17. When the mandate date is from 2014 to 2018, the equipage curves are almost parallel. 
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Aircraft adopt ADS-B Out in the maintenance cycle just before the mandate date. Because 
the maintenance cycle is 5 years in this model, aircraft begin to adopt ADS-B Out 5 years 
before the mandate date. And about 20% of aircraft adopt each year. When the mandate date 
is moved forward before 2013, aircraft have to adopt out of the maintenance cycle and 
equipage curve increase more rapidly. 
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Figure 5-17: Change of Equipage Curve by Changing Mandate Date 
 
Figure 5-18 shows the relation between the mandate date and the NPV from 2008 through 
2035. As the mandate date is moved forward, the PV of both cost and benefit increase. There 
are several reasons for the increase of cost. The first reason is that the PV of cost for early 
adoption is larger than that for late adoption because of time value of the cost. The second 
reason is that when the mandate date is before 2013, aircraft have to adopt out of the 
maintenance cycle and acquisition cost increases. This is the reason why the cost increases 
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more rapidly when the mandate is before 2013. The last reason is that old aircraft have to 
retrofit. When the mandate date is late, old aircraft will decrease because of retirement and 
new aircraft increase. The unit cost of ADS-B for old aircraft is more expensive. 
 
PV of total benefit also increases as the mandate date is moved forward. There are two 
reasons. The first reason is that many aircraft adopt before the benefit is available. Therefore, 
more aircraft can receive the benefit just after the benefit is realized. The other reason is that 
the benefit depending on other aircraft’s equipage increases because %Equipage increases 
early.  
 
When the mandate date is moved forward before 2013, the benefit becomes almost steady. 
Because the independent benefit is available only after 2013, the benefit does not increase 
even if mandate date is moved forward before 2013. On the other hand, the cost increases 
rapidly when the mandate date is moved forward before 2013. Therefore, the NPV decreases 
sharply when the mandate date is before 2013.  
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Figure 5-18: NPV and Mandate Date 
 
However, this optimal timing of the mandate equipage in Figure 5-18 is just an example 
because this model is based on many assumptions. The first assumption is all aircraft take the 
regular heavy maintenance every five years. When the regular heavy maintenance cycle is 
three years, the optimal timing of the mandate equipage will change. The optimal timing of 
the mandate equipage also depends on the assumption of the distribution of aircraft age.  
 
This model includes the benefits and costs only for aircraft operators, and does not include 
the benefits and costs for passengers and the FAA. When the benefits and costs for 
passengers and the FAA are taken into consideration, the optimal timing of the mandate 
equipage will change. 
 
Furthermore, Figure 5-18 shows the change of the NPV when the mandate date is moved 
[PV of total cost and benefit] [NPV] 
[Mandate date] 
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forward and other conditions do not change. When the other incentive policies descried in 
this thesis, such as acceleration of operational benefit, financial incentive, etc. is introduced, 
the optimal timing will also change. 
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Chapter 6 Conclusion 
 
There are several barriers to achieve successful transition from a current technology to a new 
technology. This thesis analyzed how adoption of ADS-B can be encouraged by incentive 
policies. 
 
First, to understand how individual users adopt ADS-B Out, this thesis developed a system 
dynamics model, which is mainly composed of two parts: Adoption Model and Benefit 
Model. Each part relates to the other. Adoption of ADS-B depends on benefits, and the 
benefits of ADS-B depend on how many aircraft are equipped with it.  
 
Furthermore, the acquisition cost of ADS-B is different according to its position in the 
maintenance cycle. When aircraft operators adopt ADS-B outside the regular maintenance 
cycle, the cost becomes higher. Therefore, aircraft without ADS-B are divided into 5 stocks 
based on position in the maintenance cycle, and the adoption rate is calculated separately.   
 
The acquisition cost is also different according to aircraft age. Because old aircraft are not 
equipped with GPS receivers, the acquisition cost becomes higher than the new aircraft that 
is equipped with GPS receiver. Therefore, the aircraft without ADS-B are also divided into 3 
stocks based on aircraft age.  
  
Next, using this system dynamics model, this thesis analyzed the effects of the following four 
incentive policies on adoption of ADS-B: (1) Acceleration of Operational Benefits, (2) 
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Preferred Access, (3) Financial Incentive, and (4) Mandate Equipage.  
 
First, the result of policy analysis shows the acceleration of operational benefit is effective to 
encourage the early adoption of ADS-B. Two types of acceleration of operational benefits 
were examined: High Benefit Rate type and Early Benefit type. The acceleration of Early 
Benefit type is more effective to encourage the early adoption than that of High Benefit Rate 
type.  
 
Second, preferred access is also effective as an incentive for early adoption because only 
early adopters can receive the benefit of preferred access. As the adopters increase, the 
benefits from preferred access decrease. Therefore, the preferred access is an effective policy 
to encourage early adoption. 
 
Third, the government has to be careful when financial incentives are introduced because 
financial incentives create the dead-weight loss. Financial incentives can be justified by the 
externalities such as environmental externality, safety externality, and so on. When the 
financial incentives can be justified, financial incentives can encourage early adoption. When 
financial incentives are given only to early adopters, the financial incentive becomes more 
efficient. When the financial incentives are given to late adopter as well, the financial 
incentive cannot be an incentive for early adoption.  
 
Last, the mandate equipage is an effective way to increase adopters of ADS-B. Because some 
benefits of ADS-B require the equipage of all aircraft, mandate equipage in the future is 
reasonable. When the mandate date is moved forward, the present value of the benefit of 
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ADS-B increases as well as the cost increases. This thesis showed how the optimal timing of 
mandate equipage is figured out.  
 
Finally, it should be noted that the numbers used in this thesis, such as the value of benefits 
and costs of ADS-B, optimal timing of the mandate equipage are just examples. The actual 
costs and benefits are likely to be different. So care must be used in interpretation of the 
result and further analysis should be conducted when more accurate cost and benefit 
estimates are available.  
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